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Íngrid Vendrell Ferran
Narrative Fiction as Philosophical Exploration:  
A Case Study on Self-Envy and Akrasia
1 Unamuno’s Literature as Philosophy of Emotion
Emotions were one of the main philosophical concerns of Spanish writer 
Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936). His novels, short stories, poems, narrations, 
and other fictional and non-fictional writings all seek to understand the human 
heart better. However, Unamuno rarely presents his complex and fine-grained 
views on feelings in form of statements or arguments in favour of specific posi-
tions. With the sole exception of his major essay Del Sentimiento trágico de la 
vida (1913), in which he analyses the »man of flesh and bone« and his desire for 
survival and immortality, Unamuno’s philosophy of emotions is developed pri-
marily in literary form. Indeed, his literary writings engage with a wide range of 
emotional phenomena – such as sham emotions, herostratism, envy, jealousy, 
love, hatred, malice etc. – as he aims to shed light on their constitutive role for 
human beings. Yet, in none of them do we find arguments for specific claims. As 
Carlos A. Longhurst has noted, Unamuno was not a conventional philosopher: 
»[…] he was a philosopher in a sense that has less to do with the discipline 
that is practiced in university departments of philosophy and more to do with 
the mythic style of exploring and communicating ideas though the medium of 
imagined worlds, as was the case with much Greek tragedy, with which Una-
muno was very familiar.« (Longhurst 2014, p. 153) Thus, if we want to know and 
understand the basis of Unamuno’s philosophy of emotions, we have to turn to 
his literary writings rather than to his major philosophical treatise.
Unamuno’s interest in philosophizing in literary form has two main motiva-
tions. First of all, he thought that rational argument might deceive and mis-
lead us. He did not reject rational forms of argumentation, but he was aware of 
the manifold ways in which they can lead to confusion and misinterpretation. 
Contrary to rational argument, literature does not aim at reducing the vital 
experiences to justified true statements. Secondly, and related to the first moti-
vating factor, literature has the capacity not only to present the complexities of 
human beings without circumscribing them within specific concepts but also 
to engage the reader at an emotional level. Thus, while Unamuno sees ratio-
nal argumentation and poetic reason as two complementary ways of doing 
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philosophy, he deems literature to be the most appropriate means of express-
ing the intricacies of human life.1
As noted above, Unamuno’s philosophy of emotion is presented mainly in 
literary form. As such, his fictional writings have a strong cognitive compo-
nent. They are, as Julián Marías puts it, a »method for obtaining knowledge.« 
(Marías 1950, p. 67) Literature is Unamuno’s psychological laboratory where he 
explores the possibilities of human existence. His works of fiction function as 
thought experiments through which questions concerning human nature are 
carefully investigated. However, the expressions »psychological laboratory« 
and »thought experiment« should be employed here only in a metaphorical 
sense. Unamuno’s literature shows us the complexities of human existence by 
imaginatively acquainting us with essential aspects of our human reality, but 
it does not set out overt arguments in favour of specific positions or distinct 
claims.
Inspired by Gottfried Gabriel’s philosophy of literature, I will offer a reading 
of Unamuno’s literature based on the idea that if his literature conveys knowl-
edge, it is not because we are persuaded to (dis)approve of any particular 
claim but rather because his writing places us in contact with aspects of real-
ity which are essential to an understanding of the conditio humana.2 Through 
the work of fiction, Unamuno explores and presents to the reader experiences 
that are too rich to be reduced to a set of statements. Thus, they are cognitively 
valuable not only for Unamuno but also for the reader. Given that the experi-
ences with which we are confronted while reading literature are never closed 
or resolved but instead entail moments of indeterminacy, ambiguity, and inter-
pretation, readers are invited to arrive at their own conclusions.
Taking this idea that Unamuno’s literary writings are cognitively valuable to 
both the writer and the reader, this paper explores one of his most challeng-
ing short stories: Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos (1918). In this text, Unamuno 
deals with an experience for which he coins the expression ›self-envy‹. Envy 
was a recurrent topic of fascination for Unamuno. He believed envy to be the 
most tragic of all passions since it is the one in which the conflict between real-
ity and desire, which, for Unamuno, is inherent to the nature of human beings, 
is made most tangible. As he writes: »Envy is a thousand times more terrible 
1   I follow here Ferrater Mora, according to whom Unamuno was able to develop his philosophy 
using literary as well as non-literary forms, depending on the ideas he wanted to express and 
the topics he wanted to address (Ferrater Mora 1957, p. 106). I disagree with María Zambra-
no’s interpretation, according to which Unamuno moved from non-literary to literary forms 
so as to overcome the limitations of rational argument (Zambrano 2004, p. 79).
2   Gabriel 2014, p. 163–180 and Longhurst 2014, p. 153. For a non-metaphorical use of the analogy 
between literature and thought experiments, cf. Elgin 2014, p. 221–241.
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than hunger, for it is spiritual hunger.« (Unamuno 1921, p. 55) Abel Sanchez, one 
of his most celebrated novels, is devoted to the case of existential envy, i.e., an 
envy felt towards the entire existence of another human being. Meanwhile, the 
novel La Tia Tula, the only one of his novels to feature a female protagonist, 
can be interpreted as a case study of the envy of motherhood.3 But is ›self-
envy‹ conceptually sound? Or is it an unsuitable phrase for an emotional state 
that has nothing to do with envy?
The paper proceeds in four steps in order to answer these questions. After 
presenting Unamuno’s Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos (section 2), the follow-
ing section considers the notion of self-envy, which I interpret as a singular 
but instructive case of envy (section 3). My attention then turns to a more gen-
eral emotional state, which I interpret using the concept of akratic emotion 
(section 4). The paper concludes with some considerations as to the use of 
literature as a form of thought experiment for philosophical purposes. In sum, 
I show that Artemio can be effectively read as a thought experiment in relation 
to envy and akrasia, i.e., the state of acting against one’s better judgement.
2 Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos
Unamuno’s Artemio, heuatontimoroumenos is a three-page short story. It was 
originally published in 1918 in Nuevo Mundo. The text begins with an intrigu-
ing question: May envy’s corrosive and toxic nature cause the envious person 
to envy herself, part of herself, or one of her egos? Rather than answering this 
question directly, Unamuno presents the vital struggle of a fictional character 
called ›Artemio A. Silva‹.
As it is the case with all of Unamuno’s fictional figures, Artemio is marked 
by an inner conflict. In this particular case, however, the inner conflict leads 
to a division of the self into two rival halves. On the one side, Artemio has a 
public ego – an arriviste, egoist, and optimist; on the other side, he has a pri-
vate ego – pessimistic and full of moral concerns. Both egos, which Unamuno 
calls »demonic« and »angelic« respectively, exist in permanent tension, and 
despite all efforts, Artemio is unable to resolve the struggle in favour of one 
or the other part of the self. The actions planned by the demonic ego are con-
stantly suffocated by the moral man, and simultaneously, the ideas and ideals 
of the angelic ego are systematically sabotaged by the demonic one. Neither of 
the two can emerge victorious from the permanent state of conflict. The result 
of this self-sabotaging attitude is that each one of his egos knows what action 
3   Cf. Sinclair 2001, p. 140.
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should be undertaken, and, yet, these very plans are frustrated by the other 
ego. This state of frustration and dissatisfaction leads Artemio to hate himself 
and to be self-contemptuous. He also regrets being unable to allow one of his 
egos to become dominant over the other and to take full control of his life. The 
angelic ego envies the demonic one for being goal- and action-oriented but, 
at the same time, restrains him from any perverse actions. The demonic ego 
is resentful towards the angelic one for frustrating all his perverse plans. In 
the end, the angelic ego hates the demonic one, with the former becoming as 
bad as the latter, while the demonic ego develops a strong form of contempt 
towards the angelic one. As a result, neither of Artemio’s egos is able to develop 
its respective vocation. People say of him: »He was too cowardly to be bad.« 
(translation by the author) (Unamuno 1966, p. 879)4 Artemio is unable to let 
his bad ego fully develop his bad tendencies, but he is also too faint-hearted to 
allow the angelic ego to take control of his whole life.
To describe Artemio’s existential situation, Unamuno uses the expression 
»heautontinoroumenos«, which means »the one who torments himself« and 
coins the expression »self-envy« (Unamuno 1966, p. 879).5 This concept, how-
ever, is far from being self-evidently clear, and it requires some further eluci-
dation. To speak of ›self-envy‹ seems at first sight implausible and mistaken 
for envy has traditionally been defined as an emotion that is directed towards 
others, concerningtheir goods and talents. How, then, are we to make sense of 
the idea of feeling envious of ourselves? I will attempt to answer this question 
in the following sections by arguing that the notion of ›self-envy‹ is neither 
the product of Unamuno’s overflowing imagination, nor is it the result of an 
excess of creativity; rather, ›self-envy‹ is a sound concept. An interpretation 
of this concept and the experience that it describes is necessary both to cast 
light on aspects of envy that have been overlooked hitherto in philosophical 
research and to understand the relation between emotions in general (and not 
only envy) and the will.
3 Self-Envy as Envy
Unlike psychoanalysis, which has drawn attention to the idea of ›self-envy‹ by 
studying how envy might be directed towards oneself, philosophers have paid 
4   »No tuvo valor para ser malo.«
5   My interpretation in this paper will mainly focus on the emotion of envy. Other authors have 
read Artemio through the lens of the division of the self and its moral implications, down-
playing the role of envy in this short story to a secondary one (Ilie 1967, p. 144).
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little attention to this possibility.6 Envy has been considered paradigmatically 
as a social emotion, one that is directed towards others (and their talents, qual-
ities, and existences) but not one that can be felt towards oneself. From a phil-
osophical perspective, the notion of ›self-envy‹ is paradoxical. In contrast to 
self-hatred or self-contempt, the theoretical construct of ›self-envy‹ remains, 
for philosophers, unclear. In this context, I offer Unamuno’s text as a case study 
in respect of this phenomenon and I explore what this notion might teach us 
about envy more generally.7
As already stated, Unamuno considers envy to emerge from the painful 
experience of a conflict or gap between reality and desire. More specifically, 
it is the gap between our ontological reality – the factual person that each of 
us is individually – and our ontological possibilities – the different individuals 
we could have or can become. Usually, we experience this gap by comparing 
ourselves with others who have some significance for us, but in the case of 
Artemio, Unamuno underlines the possibility of experiencing this gap by com-
paring our factual self with our desired selves without taking the other into 
consideration. Envy highlights and magnifies something we lack and some-
thing that is essential for our feeling of self-worth, though we need not com-
pare ourselves to others in order to experience such envy. For instance, this 
form of emotion might also be aroused by comparing our factual self with our 
possible selves, none of which came to be realized. For the latter case to occur, 
one would have to objectify part of oneself and consider this objectified part 
as an outsider, as something external. What is interesting in Unamuno’s short 
narration is that he interprets this case not as remorse, regret, repentance, or 
sorrow but as a case of envy, i.e., a case in which we envy ourselves for not real-
izing those possibilities inherent in ourselves.
As if the above were not enough, the case presented by Unamuno is even 
more complicated. However, once clarified, this complication might help us 
make some features of envy and self-envy more salient, but for now, some 
interpretative effort is called for. According to my interpretation, in Artemio 
there are two possible selves that work as focal points of comparison; that is to 
say, the gap between the real and desired Self can be interpreted in two differ-
ent directions:
(a) Envy between different selves (angelic vs. demonic ego): In this case, we 
have a divided self and each one of the egos envies the other. Artemio’s 
6   For a study of ›self-envy‹ in psychoanalysis by way of object relations theory, see López Corvo 
1994.
7   For Unamuno’s philosophy of the emotions (and in particular envy) in literary form, Cf. Ven-
drell Ferran forthcoming.
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angelic ego envies the capacity of the demonic ego to pursue its goals 
regardless of the means that have to be taken into consideration, whereas 
the demonic ego envies the virtuosity of the angelic one. If we assume the 
factual ego as the angelic ego – for instance, because this ego is regarded 
as Artemio’s intimate self or is characterized as his moral ›conscience‹ – 
then the demonic ego works as a desired ego – for instance, the angelic 
envies its power of determination, strength, will power, etc. But if we 
take the factual ego to be the demonic one – for instance, because this is 
Artemio’s public ego, the one that does not allow him to be a good person 
etc. – then this ego envies the angelic one for being morally good and it 
is the angelic ego that operates as the desired self. Notice that this pos-
sibility presupposes a split of the ego in two different selves which envy 
each other.
(b) Envy within each one of the parts of the self: It is also possible that each 
part of the self envies the possibilities inherent in it and those that have 
yet to be realized. In this case, we do not have a struggle between the 
angelic and the demonic ego but rather an ›internal‹ struggle within each 
part of the self. Thus, the factual demonic ego envies the possibility of 
having been a real man of action and of politics, who pursued his goals 
unscrupulously, a possibility that was constantly frustrated by the angelic 
ego. The factual demonic ego envies the desired demonic ego (who never 
came to be). Analogously, the factual angelic ego envies the possibility 
of having become a truly virtuous man, but this possibility inherent in 
him was permanently frustrated by the plans and actions of the arriviste 
and demonic ego. Here, the factual angelic ego – who was, in Unamuno’s 
own words, »hypocritical« (Unamuno 1966, p. 879) – envies the desired 
angelic ego (who never came to be). Envy here does not imply a split of 
the ego, but it takes place between a factual self and a possible desired 
self which cannot come to realization.
If this interpretation about the concept of ›self-envy‹ is right, then we should 
distinguish two different meanings of this notion which I consider to be two 
types of self-envy. (a) Self-envy as envy between parts of the self: In this case, to 
feel envious of oneself presupposes a splitting of the self in which one part 
envies the other. (b) Self-envy as envy between a factual and a possible self: Here 
a self envies the possibilities inherent in it that have not been realized. Put it 
briefly: A factual self envies a possible desired self. According to the view that 
I am defending here, both types of ›self-envy‹ resemble envy in the sense that 
this emotion points to a gap between reality and desire. We have good reasons 
to assume that ›self-envy‹ is a form of ›envy‹. An analysis of the three moments 
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belonging to the concept ›envy‹ will help us support this claim and defend the 
idea that ›self-envy‹ is a philosophically sound concept.
a) Affective Moment: At the affective level, envy is an emotion that never 
appears in isolation; rather, it is always accompanied by other negative emo-
tions. For the case of ›self-envy‹, we see that both types of this emotion are 
linked to rivalry, contempt, and hatred. There is a permanent rivalry between 
the angelic and the demonic egos (a) as well as between each one of these 
factual egos and the possibilities that each ego experiences as unfulfilled (b). 
There is also mutual hatred and contempt. As in envy, both types of ›self-envy‹ 
involve feeling the lack of power to change the situation.
b) Cognitive Moment: At the cognitive level, envy presupposes an aware-
ness of the value of the envied person. At the heart of envy lies an appraisal 
of the value of the envied. Envy also presupposes a complex set of evaluations 
to which the following elements belong: 1) Identification of a significant other 
with whom we might identify. This other must be relevant to us; 2) compari-
son by which we focus on those aspects of the envied that are relevant for our 
self-assessment and self-evaluation; 3) as a result of this comparison, we are at 
a disadvantage; 4) we deem this to be unfair; 5) and we consider the other to 
be a burden. All of these elements are also given in the case of ›self-envy‹, but 
in the latter case, there is no other whose value we perceive and to whom we 
compare ourselves.
Let’s consider these five cognitive elements for the two types of ›self-envy‹ 
mentioned above. (a) Regarding the first type, there is a splitting of the ego into 
two selves. The demonic self identifies with the angelic one because it is a for-
mer part of oneself. The demonic ego compares itself with the virtues and the 
vices of the angelic one, which is important for its self-evaluation. As a result, 
it feels at disadvantage because it considers the angelic ego to be morally bet-
ter than itself. The demonic self feels treated unfairly by the angelic one, who 
constantly reminds it of its moral flawed character, and it considers the angelic 
ego to be a burden to the realization of its plans (an analogous case can be 
built for the angelic ego envying the demonic one). (b) Regarding the second 
type of ›self-envy‹, according to which the factual self envies those inherent 
possibilities that never came to realization, we can also find the five conditions 
mentioned above. First, the factual self identifies with its past or its desires, 
and, thus, there isidentification with the possible self. It then compares itself 
with its intrinsic possibilities, which are important for its self-assessment. As a 
result, it feels a disadvantage; e.g., Artemio’s factual demonic self feels a disad-
vantage when he compares itself with what it could have achieved. It experi-
ences the situation as unfair, but the unfairness is mostly attributed to external 
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factors. One might complain that the possibilities inherent to oneself have not 
come to realization because of the lack of favourable conditions. Interestingly 
enough, what is considered to be a burden here are these external factors, but 
at the same time, it becomes clear to the envious person that it was because of 
herself that these possibilities never came to realization.
c) Conative Moment: At the conative level, envy has a strong motivational 
force, which is directed towards the symbolic or real destruction of the other, 
and which aims to change the order of the world so that the envious no longer 
feels inferior and powerless. The same conative self-destructive moment can 
be found in both cases of ›self-envy‹, but here, the destructive and corrosive 
elements are directed towards oneself. (a) In the first case of self-envy, one 
part of the self desires the annihilation of the other part of the self. (b) In the 
second type, the self can direct this destructive force towards two different 
objects: the factual self (which leads to self-contempt and self-hatred) or to the 
possibilities inherent to oneself (which leads to a passive, unambitious, and 
punishing attitude that excludes each form of human flourishing).
Unamuno’s conceptual construction of ›self-envy‹ as developed in the fig-
ure of Artemio reflects these three different moments although it does so in a 
peculiar way because instead of being directed towards a significant other, the 
target of one’s envy is oneself (in the two different cases stated above: one of 
the divided parts of the self or the possible self). To recap, despite its paradoxi-
cal appearance, the concept of ›self-envy‹ is a sound one and it can appear in 
the two types mentioned above.
4 Self-Envy as Akratic Emotion
This section will explore a different feature of Unamuno’s short story, which 
concerns not just envy but emotions more generally. To this end, one might 
ask: How are emotions related to our will? According to my proposal here, 
›self-envy‹ is a case of akratic emotion, i.e., an emotion we experience against 
our better judgement.
In this light, Artemio is not just a thought experiment about envy; it is 
also a thought experiment about the weakness of the will. The character of 
Artemio is strikingly irrational; indeed, it is unlikely that one would ever 
encounter someone like him in real life. The accusation of irrationality affects 
both types of self-envy mentioned above: the one that involves a split of the 
ego (a) and the one in which the factual self envies the possible selves (b). 
However, I will limit my interpretation in this section to the case of the split 
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of the ego because Unamuno in his narration focuses mainly on this kind of 
self-envy.8 Artemio’s demonic and angelic egos simultaneously hold contradic-
tory beliefs, desires, and feelings. We can identify irrational patterns on at least 
three levels: 1) Cognitive Irrationality: At the cognitive level, Artemio is able to 
hold opposing beliefs about what he should think of himself, of life, and of 
others; 2) Practical Irrationality: The demonic and the angelic ego constantly 
plan conflicting actions; and 3) Emotional Irrationality: Artemio’s two egos 
experience emotions that are mutually exclusive.
This attribution of irrationality should not lead us to interpret Artemio as 
crazy and pathological but rather as a philosophically interesting case that 
deserves full attention. The aspect that I am interested in here is that Artemio 
remains in this situation of pain and conflict throughout his entire life despite 
his better judgement. For Artemio, the contradictory feelings and the sense 
of extreme ambivalence that he has towards himself are very unpleasant. He 
suffers and is frustrated, which leads him to despise himself. Artemio is aware 
that it would be better not to have these emotions, but he is unable to get rid 
of them: Neither the angelic ego nor the demonic one is able to assume control 
over the other part of the self. The strategy of partitioning the self into two dif-
ferent egos does not alleviate the pain: Both parts remain in constant tension 
and conflict. At the end, Unamuno describes how the two egos merge into one 
another: The angelic becomes lost in the demonic one, leading to the dissolu-
tion of both (Unamuno 1966, p. 879). But his entire life was one of suffering and 
pain. How is this possible?
In what follows, an answer to this question will be given by focusing on the 
last case of irrationality mentioned above, which affects Artemio’s emotions. 
To this end, it is necessary to introduce the concept of ›akratic emotion‹. ›Akra-
sia‹ is usually interpreted as a phenomenon that concerns intentional actions 
that are carried out against the agent’s better judgement. However, as Alfred 
Mele has shown, it is also possible to consider an analogous case for emotions, 
that is to say that we might experience emotions against our better judgement. 
Examples of akratic emotions abound in our everyday lives: We may be in love 
with someone who we think does not deserve it, or we might feel envious of 
our best friend while thinking that we should in fact celebrate her success. 
Artemio should be interpreted in line with these examples.
Mele defines akratic emotions as follows: »S’s being or remaining in a feeling- 
state, X, during t is an instance of strict akratic feeling if and only if S’s being 
8   It is not difficult to imagine cases in which the factual self judges, acts, and feels differently 
than his possible self.
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or remaining in X during t is uncompelled and, during t, S consciously holds 
a judgement to the effect that there is good and sufficient reason for his not 
being or remaining in X.« (Mele 1989, p. 281)9 There are three main features 
entailed in this definition, which should be fleshed out before applying them 
to Artemio’s case.
1) Akratic emotion is an emotion that exists against the subject’s better judge-
ment (Mele 1989, p. 277). A first feature of akratic emotions is that the 
subject of the emotion judges that it is better not to experience it.
2) Akratic emotion is experienced as unexplainable. It is not just that we do 
not want to experience it but also that we cannot understand why we 
experience it. Thus, to feel nervous before an important event in our life, 
despite our not wanting to feel this way, is not an instance of akratic emo-
tion because in this case we find the emotion reasonable.
3) Akratic emotions must be uncompelled. According to Mele, akratic emo-
tions can be controlled by the subject who experiences them (cf. Mele 
1989, p. 278). While phobia is a case of compelled emotion, i.e., an emo-
tion that is beyond our control (think of, for instance, the uncontrolled 
fear that an arachnophobic feels towards spiders even if he knows they 
are not dangerous), akratic emotions are under the subject’s control. 
When we experience an akratic emotion, we need to have at our disposal 
a suitable means to prevent ourselves from feeling it or to change it. We 
are not just helpless victims of our akratic emotions: The subject has at 
her disposal ways of bringing these emotions into line with her better 
judgement. For instance, we may center our attention in order to under-
stand the deep roots and sources of our feelings or we may contrast our 
perception of a certain situation with the perceptions others might have 
of the same situation.
All of these moments, which, according to Mele, are characteristic of akratic 
emotions, might be applied to Artemio’s case. The first two criteria seem 
unproblematic. He judges it would be better not to be ambivalent, and he not 
only rejects the ambivalence but also finds it unreasonable. However, the last 
feature of akratic emotions in Mele’s model seems questionable when applied 
to Artemio. Is Artemio’s ambivalence a compelled or an uncompelled emotion? 
Does Artemio have some responsibility for and control over his feelings? We 
tend to judge him to be responsible for his feelings: He should put his emotions 
9   Although Mele speaks about »feelings«, in this paper, I apply his theory to the case of ›emo-
tions‹. I take emotions to constitute a specific type of ›feeling‹ – one that is based on cogni-
tions (perceptions, imaginings, beliefs, and suppositions), with a specific phenomenology, 
and which is directed towards values.
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in line with his better judgement. And we think that he has at his disposal ways 
to overcome his ambivalence. At the same time and despite all efforts, Artemio 
fails and cannot allow one of his egos to take control of his life. Thus, his case 
shows that the boundaries between compelled and uncompelled emotions are 
not easy to trace.10 As formulated by Mele, the third criterion is too vague to 
be successfully applied to our case, and it requires more refinement in order 
to help us explain what happens when we are not in control of our emotions.
For this refinement, I will take up a suggestion proposed by Dina Mendonça, 
according to which cases of akratic emotion are those in which »we also feel 
confused, puzzled and sometimes surprised by our own feelings, unearth-
ing a meta-emotional level within our emotional world.« (Mendonça 2016, 
p. 53) Mendonça’s point here is that we do not simply experience an akratic 
emotion; we also react emotionally to it. This is precisely what happens to 
Artemio in Unamuno’s short story: The character develops emotional atti-
tudes of contempt, anger, sadness, resentment, and hatred towards his own 
feeling of ambivalence. He despises himself for being the way he is, an irre-
mediably envious person, incapable of establishing a consistent personality. 
Akratic emotions might come together with a meta-emotional level: They 
involve meta-emotions about the initial emotions. The analysis of these meta- 
emotions might serve to refine Mele’s third criterion for akratic emotions con-
cerning the possibility of taking control over our own (akratic) feelings.
Prima facie, there are two important elements here. First, an akratic emo-
tion usually involves a meta-emotion, which takes place concurrently with the 
akratic emotion. The akratic emotion will determine and influence the kind 
of meta-emotions we experience towards it, but it is also possible that the 
meta-emotion (or meta-emotions) might interact with the akratic emotion, 
influencing, shaping, colouring, and moulding it. The influence that meta-
emotions might exert over akratic emotions may come in different degrees 
and take different forms. For instance, it is possible that meta-emotions can 
reinforce our first-order emotions, as when we are sad about being sad. But it 
is also possible that both emotional experiences move in opposite directions, 
as when one feels embarrassed about being angry. In Artemio’s case, the latter 
possibility is in evidence: He feels uneasy about his ambivalence. The fact that 
meta-emotion and akratic emotion are in contradiction leads him to become 
aware that he really wants to eliminate his ambivalence. It might also motivate 
him to transform the akratic emotion (i.e., his ambivalence) into a more desir-
able emotion. This points to the possibility of taking control over his feelings. 
10   For this criticism, cf. Mendonça 2016, 52.
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While he will not succeed in this enterprise, the meta-emotions regulate his 
awareness and motivate him to change.
Moreover, the meta-emotions might give the subject of akratic emotions 
a kind of internal coherence. While Artemio’s akratic emotion is marked by 
ambivalence, it can be the case that his meta-emotions are more unitary. All 
his meta-emotions signal a rejection of his akratic feelings. The meta-emotions 
might give Artemio’s self a kind of unity and coherence that is lacking in the 
first-order emotions. Behind a divided self, we discover a unitary self: Behind 
the akratic emotion, there exists a self that is able to react coherently. This is 
only a possibility, but it is worth to explore when trying to find certain coher-
ence behind Artemio’s irrational behaviour.
This ability to become aware of what we feel, to be motivated to change how 
we feel, and to react in a coherent manner towards what we feel is linked to 
the possibility of gaining control over our own emotions. Such considerations 
demonstrate that Artemio’s akratic emotions can be seen to be ›uncompelled‹: 
At a meta-level, he is able to take a stance towards them, to become aware of 
them, and to influence them, for instance, by altering his perceptions of him, 
by judging his akratic emotions as wrong, and by imagining possible ways to 
overcome them. Artemio was not compelled to feel these emotions, and he can 
take some responsibility for them: In the end, he was able to step back and to 
reflect on them.
Despite the possibility of taking some control over his akratic emotion, i.e., 
the emotion of ›self-envy‹, Artemio remained, throughout his life, in a perma-
nent struggle. What might explain his remaining in such a state? One’s better 
judgement is not sufficient to dissolve the akratic emotion. What appears to 
sustain the whole system of self-sabotage is a deep-rooted lack of self-esteem, 
or more precisely, a strong sense of self-hatred. Because of his negative emo-
tions, Artemio was focusing on reasons that he considered to be insufficient, 
wrong, or less motivating. Better judgement alone is not adequate to change 
an akratic situation because beneath that judgement, there is an emotional 
phenomenon or a set of emotional phenomena that sustains it.11
11   In the contemporary debate about akrasia, only judgements, desires, and intentions 
seem to play a role in explaining akratic action. By contrast, my account works with the 
assumption that emotions might also be pertinent in the explanation of akrasia. For an 
account in support of the view that emotions are causally involved in akratic action and 
make the latter intelligible, see Tappolet 2003, p. 98.
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5 Exploring Envy and Akrasia through Fiction
In the previous sections I have offered an interpretation of Unamuno’s Artemio 
as a thought experiment in relation to envy and akrasia. In this paper, Arte-
mio’s divided self, which enabled an experience of ›self-envy‹, was interpreted 
in two steps. First, I maintained that the concept of ›self-envy‹ is a sound one. 
Second, I considered Artemio’s emotional experience to be a case of akratic 
emotion. However, the claims about envy and akrasia developed above cannot 
be found in Unamuno’s short story. The author presents us with an extreme 
emotional experience, one that goes beyond what we would normally encoun-
ter in real life, but he is not arguing for or against any concrete philosophical 
statement. Now, the question arises whether my reading of Unamuno’s text 
is legitimate: Would Unamuno himself consider my philosophical exercise a 
fruitful way of reading his text?
To answer this question, it is necessary to return to the idea of a thought 
experiment as introduced in the first section. Unamuno’s chief aim in his fic-
tional writings was to confront the reader with certain aspects of human expe-
rience, particularly those that are challenging and enigmatic. According to the 
view developed in the paper, if literature is a method of obtaining knowledge, 
this means that the author reveals the complexities of different human situ-
ations and not that he analyses premises and develops arguments in his fic-
tional writings. As already stated, Unamuno was interested in exploring the 
intricacies of the human heart. His literary writings allowed him to explore 
questions around the self and it’s emotions, the weakness of the will, freedom, 
and personality. But, in my view, Unamuno wrote his literary fictions with the 
aim that they would function as thought experiments not only for him but also 
for his readers.
Unamuno used literary fictions and other literary forms to explore aspects 
of the human condition. His narrative technique consisted in writing ›ovipa-
rous‹ novels, i.e., novels that have a short period of gestation and that he imme-
diately felt compelled to write after having the initial idea to develop them, 
without following a plan. In addition, his ›nivolas‹ (rather than novellas) cor-
respond to this pattern of creation. Nivolas is a genre he invented that is much 
more interested in the monologues and dialogues between the characters than 
in the descriptions of time and space or in plot development. They aim to 
explore the psychology of the figures and to highlight certain aspects of human 
experience. Unamuno writes ›a lo que salga‹, i.e., no matter what happens; he 
develops his ideas by writing them down in a novel and letting them take on a 
life of their own.
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We can distinguish two main aims in this way of writing literature. On the 
one side, Unamuno utilised his literary writings in order to explore aspects 
of the human condition for his own edification. On the other side, he also 
aimed to present the reader with aspects of the human condition that are too 
complex to be reduced to mere statements. Rather than confronting us with 
certain theses about what it means to be human, to feel and to suffer, and so 
on, Unamuno confronts us with situations in which certain aspects are made 
more salient than others, so that we are provoked to reflect on them. His phi-
losophy is not presented by way of logical claims and detailed argumentation; 
instead, it is presented in context and as a living and evolving phenomenon. 
Indeed, Unamuno considered narrative fictions to be a better means to engage 
the reader than philosophical statements or treatises. Works of fiction engross 
the reader at a deeper level, one that goes beyond rational understanding. This 
involvement is made possible because, unlike philosophical statements, which 
are presented as objective in the form of a treatise or a paper, literary fictions 
affect the reader’s emotions and feelings and elicit aspects of their own biog-
raphy and subjective experiences. As such, Unamuno sought an active reader, 
one who becomes involved in the text and who is compelled to reach her own 
conclusions about the situations depicted on the page.12
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